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ABSTRACT
Many firms use forced rating systems in which supervisors must evaluate em-
ployees according to a predefined distribution. We develop new theory sug-
gesting that forced ratings are less likely to enhance performance when super-
visors assess subjective dimensions of employee performance (e.g., creativity),
but can have some harmful side effects. In a laboratory experiment, employ-
ees work on a creative task, and supervisors rate their performance. We do
not find any difference in the employees’ performance or effort in a creative
task setting between forced and free ratings. We do, however, find that forced
ratings create higher stress for employees (ex post stress scales and biomark-
ers). Higher stress in turn mitigates the positive effect of effort on creativity.
Furthermore, we find that actual creativity explains less of supervisors’ rat-
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ings of employees’ performance under forced ratings. Instead, factors that
are unrelated to actual creativity, such as eloquent writing and strategic gam-
ing behavior, matter more. Results of an additional online experiment con-
firm that forced ratings work differently in tasks where performance needs
to be evaluated subjectively compared to tasks where objective measures are
available.
JEL codes: D91, J33, M40, M41, M52, M55
Keywords: forced rating systems; performance evaluation; creativity; stress
and subjectivity
1. Introduction
For bonus allocation and evaluation of employees, firms typically use sys-
tems in which supervisors assign performance ratings to employees. To ap-
pear fair, reduce confrontation cost, or avoid harm to group cohesion, su-
pervisors often tend to be lenient and insufficiently differentiate employ-
ees in these ratings (Kampkötter and Sliwka [2011], Moers [2005], Rynes,
Gerhart, and Parks [2005], Bol, Kramer, and Maas [2016]). Consequently,
the incentive effect of the ratings diminishes (Prendergast [1999], Moers
[2005], Bol [2011]). To overcome these problems, many firms implement
forced rating systems, in which supervisors must rate employees according
to a predefined distribution (Grote [2005]).1 However, practitioners say
forced ratings can be counterproductive when jobs require more subjective
assessments by supervisors, such as judgments on creative work, innovation,
or knowledge development. In such settings, forced ratings can lead to ex-
cessive stress, to frustration and giving up, and may harm innovation (e.g.,
Guralnik, Rozmarin, and So [2004]).
We use a creative context that requires a subjective evaluation by the su-
pervisor. We examine how a forced rating system (i.e., supervisors must use
the entire rating scale), compared to a free rating system (i.e., supervisors
are not restricted in how they assign ratings), affects employees’ reactions
in terms of effort, stress, and performance and supervisors’ rating behavior.
This research is important because forced ratings are widely used but also
controversial. About one-third of the Fortune 500 firms use some form of
a forced rating system to evaluate their employees (Alsever [2008], Bates
[2003]). Also human capital–intensive firms, such as audit firms, banks,
consultancies, law firms, and tech companies (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Ya-
hoo!), use or have used forced rating systems (Wall Street Journal [2014]).
Yet forced ratings are purported to be stressful and damaging, particularly
1 Forced rating systems are sometimes referred to as forced rankings, forced distributions,
or rank-and-yank systems (Scullen, Bergey, and Aiman-Smith [2005], Stewart, Gruys, and
Storm [2010]). We use the term forced rating systems to refer to all of these systems. In a
well-known example of such a forced rating system, at General Electric, 20% of the employees
had to receive a rating as top performers, 70% as average, and 10% as lowest ranking (and the
last group often had to leave the company) (Stewart, Gruys, and Storm [2010]).
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when performance is hard to quantify (e.g., Guralnik, Rozmarin, and So
[2004], Wall Street Journal [2014]). Despite this being an important and
controversial topic, research on it remains scarce. An exception is Berger,
Harbring, and Sliwka [2013], who show that forced ratings enhance per-
formance by causing an incentive effect. Although they examine a setting
with a clear objective outcome measure, far less is known about contexts in
which an objective measure is not available.
We develop new theory to argue that forced rating systems unlikely in-
crease employee performance when supervisors must assess subjective di-
mensions of employees’ work. When performance is assessed subjectively,
employees may hold different views of their performance than their super-
visors. Moreover, the uncertainty about what is required to achieve the best
rating or to avoid the worst can increase their frustration and inclination to
give up. Thus, it is not clear whether employees would work harder under
forced rating systems, compared to free rating systems, in a more subjective
context. The uncertainty and concerns about how to achieve a better rat-
ing can, however, cause anxiety about the evaluation, increasing employees’
stress (Guralnik, Rozmarin, and So [2004], Rock, Davis, and Jones [2014],
Rock [2009]). Therefore, we predict that forced ratings cause high lev-
els of psychological stress for employees. This stress, in turn, can blinker
people (Burke [1991], Zak and Nadler [2010]), limiting their state of psy-
chological availability (Binyamin and Carmeli [2010], Byron, Khazanchi,
and Nazarian [2010]) and potentially leading to “choking under pressure”
(Baumeister [1984]). Thus, although people may work hard on creativ-
ity, high levels of stress can undermine their efforts (e.g., Amabile [1996],
Webb, Williamson, and Zhang [2013]). Consequently, we hypothesize that
high levels of stress mitigate the positive effect of effort on creativity.
For the performance ratings, forced ratings can mitigate leniency and
compression in the supervisors’ performance evaluations compared to free
ratings. This can strengthen the link between a supervisor’s ratings of em-
ployees and their actual performance. However, rating employees relative
to each other or identifying someone as poor performer can be very chal-
lenging for supervisors without an objective measure (Rock, Davis, and
Jones [2014]). Anecdotes suggest that supervisors use various strategies to
cope with this difficulty (e.g., Schleicher, Bull, and Green [2009]), which
can weaken the link between actual performance and ratings. For exam-
ple, they may consider other information about employees or irrelevant
dimensions of their output to try to make ratings more objective toward
the employees. Moreover, they may strategically game the system by switch-
ing the ratings of employees each period to ensure that every employee
receives a good and bad rating at some point in time. Given the competing
arguments, we do not make a directional prediction about the difference
between the forced and free rating systems in the extent to which perfor-
mance ratings reflect actual performance.
We conduct an experiment in which we match three employee partici-
pants with one supervisor participant. Employees develop creative solutions
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for societal problems (Cardinaels, Dierynck, and Hu [2020]). Supervisors,
whose compensation depends on the creativity of their employees, rate the
employees’ creative performance on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 = good
performer, 2 = average performer, and 3 = bad performer. After each of
the five independent rounds of play, employees receive their ratings. Al-
though these ratings determine the employee’s bonus, we also use a time-
saving bonus (Tafkov [2013]) to measure employee’s willingness to expend
costly effort. We measure the creativity of each idea via an independent as-
sessment committee assessing all ideas after all sessions ended (Amabile
[1982], Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson [2008]). We manipulate
the performance evaluation system (forced vs. free rating system) between
participants. In the forced rating system, supervisors must use the entire rat-
ing scale, which means that the ratings of 1, 2, and 3 all need to be assigned.
The free rating system does not restrict supervisors, which means they can
assign the same rating to multiple employees or use the entire spectrum.
Besides the effort measure (time spent), we measure the participants’ stress
levels by psychological stress scales and a biomarker (i.e., cortisol) to cap-
ture stress caused by neurological reactions (Binyamin and Carmeli [2010],
Byron, Khazanchi, and Nazarian [2010], Dickerson and Kemeny [2004]).
For supervisors, we measure their rating behavior.
In contrast to prior research, we do not find higher performance or ef-
fort under a forced rating system than under a free rating system in our cre-
ative task setting. However, we do find that the forced rating system causes
participants to perceive higher levels of stress. Using the sample of male
participants, for whom cortisol levels are more sensitive to stress interven-
tions (Kudielka, Hellhammer, and Wüst [2009], Reschke-Hernández et al.
[2017]), the results from the cortisol measurement confirm that, compared
to free ratings, forced ratings induce neurological reactions that increase
stress. Consistent with our prediction, our results further show that greater
perceived stress mitigates the positive effects of effort on creativity.
Turning to supervisors’ ratings, we find that forced ratings reduce le-
niency in the ratings. We, however, also find that the creativity of ideas has
less impact on the ratings employees receive under forced ratings, com-
pared to free ratings. In line with our theory, supervisors start to value as-
pects of performance unrelated to creativity that are easier to justify to the
employees. Language analysis of the submitted ideas shows that employees’
use of eloquent language influence supervisors’ ratings more strongly in
the forced rating system, even though this is unrelated to actual creativity.
Additional tests further show that supervisors strategically game the forced
rating system by more often swapping employees to different performance
ranks across rounds. These dysfunctional effects can explain why the rela-
tion between creativity and ratings is weaker under forced ratings.
We run an additional online experiment with Prolific participants to
gain further confidence that forced ratings work differently in settings
where performance is evaluated more subjectively, compared to the ob-
jective task settings that have been studied before (Berger, Harbring, and
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Sliwka [2013]). We again match three employees with one supervisor, who
evaluates employees’ performance. In a 2 × 2 design, we manipulate the
task environment (subjective task vs. objective task) and the performance
evaluation scheme the supervisor must use (forced vs. free rating). For the
objective task, employees solve slider bars, in which the number of cor-
rect sliders provides an objective measure to the supervisor. In contrast,
for the subjective task, employees again work on a creative task (i.e., ideas
for societal problems), in which an objective measure is not available. The
experiment is only a one-round setting, and employees only learn about
their rating after the experiment’s end. Yet, the results show that forced
ratings increase performance in the slider task but not in the creative task.
In line with our reasoning, forced ratings increase worries about the eval-
uation criteria in the creative task but decrease them in the objective task
setting. These worries in turn affect the stress that participants experience.
Similar to the main experiment, stress decreases the effort–performance re-
lation in the creative task setting. In contrast, in the slider task, stress does
not hurt performance, and higher effort directly increases performance.
These process results offer corroborating evidence that forced ratings work
differently when assessing performance requires subjective judgments.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to an
ongoing debate on forced ratings and show that there are several important
problems associated with the use of forced ratings. In contrast to Berger,
Harbring, and Sliwka [2013], who studied a setting in which performance
can be objectively measured, we do not find a performance-enhancing ef-
fect of forced ratings. Instead, when performance must be evaluated sub-
jectively, we find that forced ratings cause significantly higher stress, which
weakens the positive connection between effort and creativity. Moreover,
while supervisors are rewarded for stimulating creativity, our results suggest
that supervisors, under a forced rating system, move away from evaluating
creativity per se. Instead, they focus on other aspects of employees’ perfor-
mance that are easier to justify to employees, and they strategically game
the system. These detrimental effects may explain why some well-known
companies that once used forced ratings have stopped using them (e.g.,
General Electric, Microsoft, Amazon; Wall Street Journal [2014]). Although
we test our theory in a creative context, our predictions likely generalize
to other aspects of jobs that require a subjective evaluation (e.g., quality,
knowledge sharing).
Second, we add to the literature on creativity and control. Although
Kachelmeier, Wang, and Williamson [2019] show that incentives can in-
crease the long-term creative performance of individuals, studies typically
do not find positive effects on immediate creative performance in more
short-term oriented tasks (e.g., Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson
[2008], Erat and Gneezy [2016, 2017], Webb, Williamson, and Zhang
[2013]; Kachelmeier, Webb, Williamson [2020]). We also consider a short-
term task setting and find a positive relation between effort and creative
performance when stress is low. However, high stress attenuates this positive
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relation. We thus provide direct evidence for the choking-under-pressure
argument that these studies often allude to. Moreover, studies often ex-
amine the effects of incentives on creative output without having super-
visors directly rate employees’ creativity (e.g., Kachelmeier, Reichert, and
Williamson [2008], Kachelmeier, Wang, and Williamson [2019]). We show
the performance evaluation system that supervisors have to use can affect
the weights they attach to different aspects of creative performance. Al-
though studies have shown that employees tend to ignore subjective di-
mensions of performance (Bentley [2019], Choi, Hecht, and Tayler [2012,
2013]), our results suggest that even supervisors may cause such a distor-
tion. These potential distortions can provide a first step in explaining why
forced ratings can harm a company’s innovation.
Finally, studying the impact of stress caused by incentive systems pro-
vides new insights to companies, employees, and society. Studies suggest
that about 40 million employees in the European Union experience work-
related stress (Parent-Thirion et al. [2007]), and a survey of U.S. and U.K.
employees indicates that over a quarter of respondents fear experiencing
burnout within the next 12 months (Wrike [2018]). This situation creates
tremendous costs for society (e.g., healthcare costs) and for companies
(e.g., lack of motivation, absenteeism, and turnover). Our results show that
elevated stress undermines the positive effect of effort on creative perfor-
mance, thereby dampening the employees’ output. Gaining insights into
how various evaluation systems affect stress using our techniques (e.g., cor-
tisol measurement and stress scales) can help companies to design proper
incentives.
2. Related Literature and Theoretical Predictions
Performance evaluation systems tend to vary across firms. One key dif-
ference in evaluation systems is whether the firm restricts its supervisors
to assigning employee ratings from a specific scale such as high, medium,
or low performer (Cascio [1991], Dominick [2009]). In a free rating sys-
tem, supervisors are not restricted and can assign the ratings in any way
they find suitable. Even though supervisors can compare the performance
of employees, relative to each other, they can provide the same rating to
multiple employees in a unit. Research shows that such systems can lead to
compression and leniency in the performance ratings (Moers [2005], Bol,
Kramer, and Maas [2016], Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks [2005]). To reduce
these biases, firms can use a forced rating system, whereby supervisors are
required to assign a certain fraction of employees for example to the high-,
medium-, or low-performance categories (Dominick [2009]). As supervi-
sors must use the full rating scale, they are forced to evaluate employees
relative to each other. The consequences can be severe in practice, where
employees receiving the lowest rank are sometimes even dismissed (Lawler
[2002], Gupta [2018]). Therefore, such forced rating systems are contro-
versially discussed. Yet many companies use or have used forced ratings,
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including knowledge-intensive companies, such as audit firms, consultan-
cies, banks, law firms, and tech companies (Wall Street Journal [2014]).
Academic research on forced ratings has been limited. In a simulation
study, Scullen, Bergey, and Aiman-Smith [2005] find that the dismissal of
lower ranks can lead to improvements in work force potential in the first
years of implementation but not in the long run. Schleicher, Bull, and
Green [2009] show, in two experiments, that supervisors under a forced
rating system perceive assigning ratings as more difficult and have less
confidence in their ratings and perceive them as unfair. Finally, Berger,
Harbring, and Sliwka [2013] show, in an experiment, that forced rating
systems can have positive effects on individuals’ performance. They show
that forced ratings indeed strengthen the incentive effect of evaluations by
reducing compression and leniency biases. These positive effects are ob-
served in a simple task setting where performance can be objectively mea-
sured, people of similar ability compete, and sabotage across workers is
impossible (Harbring et al. [2007], Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka [2013]).
Yet practitioners argue that forced rating systems can be harmful, partic-
ularly for knowledge-intensive companies, where success typically depends
on qualities like innovation, citizenship, or creativity, which require subjec-
tive judgments for evaluation (Guralnik, Rozmarin, and So [2004], Gupta
[2018]). We study the use of forced rating systems, relative to free rating
systems, in a creative context in which employees generate creative ideas
and evaluators must rate employees according to their creative task per-
formance. We predict that forced ratings may not have the performance-
enhancing effects that prior studies documented in objective task settings.
Much of the theory that we develop likely also applies to other work envi-
ronments where employees work on tasks for which output or part of their
output is hard to quantify.
2.1 effect of the forced ratings on effort
Studies show that, in settings with clearly quantifiable measures, inducing
higher variation in the ratings between good and bad performers through
a forced rating strengthens the incentive effect and hence leads to higher
effort, relative to free rating systems (Abeler et al. [2010]; Kampkötter and
Sliwka [2011], Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka [2013]). The extent to which
this positive effect of forced ratings on the employee’s effort also holds in a
setting where performance is evaluated subjectively is not clear.
On the one hand, by working harder, employees can improve their per-
formance and the likelihood of receiving a good rating. Consequently, the
larger variation induced by the forced rating schemes may increase their ef-
fort. On the other hand, the ratings that a supervisor assigns to employees
might be debatable because of their subjectivity. In such situations, employ-
ees often have more positive views of their own performance than their
supervisors do (Alicke et al. [1995]). However, supervisors must assign low
ratings in a forced rating system. Given that there is no clear objective sig-
nal of why the creative performance of one person is better than that of
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another, a relatively low rating can demotivate. Demotivation can also occur
because people feel that the higher performer may not deserve the rating.
Forced ratings therefore may reduce the motivation to expend effort in
future periods. In a free rating system, supervisors can accommodate these
concerns by giving, for example, more employees a good rating when more
ideas look good or avoiding assigning a good rank to mediocre ideas. Based
on this reasoning, forced ratings may lower employee effort. Which effect
dominates is unclear. Hence, we formulate a nondirectional hypothesis.
H1: There is a difference in the employees’ effort under forced versus
free rating systems.
2.2 effect of the forced ratings on employee stress
Practitioners claim that the performance evaluation under forced rat-
ing systems can produce adverse effects on stress, which can harm compa-
nies (Zak and Nadler [2010]). Psychology theory suggests that two main
factors contribute to stress reactions for individuals (Dickerson and Kem-
ney [2004]). First, the situation needs to be one in which employees are
concerned about the outcome. That is, the self-identity individuals want to
preserve or achieve must be at stake. Second, the situation must include
uncontrollability and uncertainty. Individuals cannot fully avoid negative
outcomes or succeed with certainty, even though they try to deliver their
best efforts. When both of these factors are present, individuals experience
stress that can lead to neurological reactions, such as higher levels of corti-
sol (Dickerson and Kemeny [2004]).
Performance evaluation of individuals satisfies the first factor. As long
as individuals work on a task they care about and a supervisor evaluates
their work, an individual’s self-identity is at stake. We argue that the per-
ceived uncertainty, the second factor, varies with the performance evalu-
ation scheme. Although subjective performance evaluation always entails
some uncertainty, which can cause perceptions of injustice, distorted eval-
uations, and anxiety among employees (Scullen, Bergey, and Aiman-Smith
[2005, p. 2], Stewart, Gruys, and Storm [2010], Moon, Scullen, and Latham
[2016]), we argue that forced ratings amplify these negative feelings. Under
a forced rating system, a supervisor must rank employees. An employee’s
rating depends on the supervisor’s judgment of that person’s performance
and how the supervisor judges that performance relative to peers. Without
objective measures available, this raises concerns about the criteria the su-
pervisor uses for differentiating the employees’ performance. With the in-
herent lack of clear evaluation criteria, this need to rank creates even more
uncertainty for employees, which likely causes worry and anxiety about
someone’s evaluation and the ranking achieved (Hazels and Sasse [2008]).
These worries can cause neurological stress reactions in the brain imposing
relatively high levels of stress on employees (Binyamin and Carmeli [2010],
Byron, Khazanchi, and Nazarian [2010]). Under a free rating scheme, a
supervisor still uses a subjective evaluation but the ratings do not directly
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depend on how the supervisor evaluates peers’ performance. That is, many
employees may excel and be rewarded accordingly, largely mitigating con-
cerns about the criteria for differentiation. Consequently, we expect that
employees will be less worried and stressed about their evaluation under
free ratings. Thus, our second hypothesis predicts that, relative to free rat-
ings, the higher uncertainty of forced ratings contributes to greater stress
among employees.2
H2: Forced ratings lead to higher employee stress levels than free rat-
ings.
2.3 effect of effort and stress on task performance
The extent to which the effort and stress induced by forced and free rat-
ings affect task performance is not straightforward. Even though the con-
nection between effort and creativity is weaker than in many other settings,
working hard is still one of the drivers of creative task performance (e.g.,
Amabile [1996], Brüggen, Feichter, and Williamson [2018], Kachelmeier,
Wang, and Williamson [2019]). Without sufficient effort and active think-
ing about creative ideas, high creative performance is difficult to achieve
(Brüggen, Feichter, and Williamson [2018], Kachelmeier et al. [2020]).
Based on these arguments, one may expect a positive relation between ef-
fort and creative task performance.
However, studies argue that the connection between high effort and per-
formance in complex tasks is not obvious (Camerer and Hogarth [1999],
Bonner et al. [2000]). Baumeister [1984] shows that high levels of pressure
and stress can lead to choking, in which people work hard but their effort
does not lead to improved performance. Similarly, Ariely et al. [2009] show
that, instead of increasing performance, very high levels of incentives can
actually harm performance in certain task settings. In a creative task, such
as the one we examine, we argue that excessive stress can also induce chok-
ing under pressure, consistent with the argument of Baumeister [1984].
Specifically, we argue that high levels of evaluative stress can affect an in-
dividual’s state of psychological availability (Burke [1991], Binyamin and
Carmeli [2010], Byron, Khazanchi, and Nazarian [2010]), such that effort
might not always yield higher creativity.
When people focus too much on achieving high ratings or the crite-
ria for evaluation, they draw valuable resources away from parts of the
brain responsible for complex and abstract thinking required for creativ-
ity (Rock [2009], Zak and Nadler [2010], Heffernan [2014]) and allocate
this attention instead to scoring well on the ratings (Burke [1991], Byron
and Carmeli [2010]). Moreover, creativity requires trial and error and risk-
taking, which can occasionally lead to failure. People under high levels of
2 The hypothesis presented is not without tension. In fact, forced ratings could decrease the
stress levels of individuals, as there is no chance to renege by giving out only low ratings from
the supervisor’s perspective.
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Fig 1.—Theoretical prediction for employee perspective.
stress typically become more risk averse and fall back on habits to avoid a
bad rating (Binyamin and Carmeli [2010], Zak and Nadler [2010]), miti-
gating the extent to which their effort translates into creativity. Based on
these insights, we predict that higher levels of stress will mitigate the posi-
tive relation between effort and creativity.
H3: High stress levels decrease the positive effect of effort on creativity.
If we summarize our three hypotheses, the effect of the forced rating
compared to free rating on overall creative performance is difficult to pre-
dict. Although forced ratings may lead to an improvement of effort that we
argue to be uncertain in H1, forced ratings at the same time lead to higher
levels of evaluative stress as we argue in H2. These higher stress levels can
reduce the positive effect that effort has on creative performance as pre-
dicted in H3, implying that forced rating systems may have a limited impact
on creative performance. Figure 1 summarizes our theoretical predictions
from the employee perspective.
2.4 effect of the forced ratings on the behavior of raters
Although forced ratings pose challenges for supervisors who conduct
evaluations (Bates [2003], Rock, Davis, and Jones [2014]), research has
largely neglected supervisors’ rating behavior. To the extent that free rat-
ings tend to suffer from evaluation biases, forced rating systems can im-
prove the link between actual performance and employee ratings (Berger,
Harbring, and Sliwka [2013]). Yet the differentiation of employees can be
difficult when a group of employees is small, when realized performance
is quite similar, or when objective measures are absent (Lawler [2002],
Blume, Baldwin, and Rubin [2009], Schleicher, Bull, and Green [2009],
Stewart, Gruys, and Storm [2010], Gupta [2018]). In line with this, Schle-
icher, Bull, and Green [2009] find that supervisors perceive assigning rat-
ings under a forced system to be very challenging and they do not always
perceive these ratings as fair.
In a forced rating system, supervisors must rate employees relative to
each other and assign high, medium, and low ratings to their employees.
This creates pressure for supervisors to justify their ratings, particularly
when assessing performance requires subjective judgment. To overcome
forced rating systems 11
this discomfort, supervisors might resort to alternative strategies, which
can distort the link between the actual performance and ratings (Lawler
[2002], Bates [2003]). For example, to deal with the justification pressure
of their evaluations, supervisors may try to objectify the rating by overem-
phasizing or including other dimensions of performance that seem easier
to justify (e.g., Stewart, Gruys, and Storm [2010], Bol and Smith [2011]).
When this happens, a well-described idea that is less novel might be seen as
more creative, compared to a more novel one that is not as well-articulated.
Or the total sales of a sales agent might be easier to objectively justify than
someone’s contribution to collegiality and productivity of a group. Conse-
quently, supervisors construct a definition of performance that is easier to
justify to their employees at the expense of the “genuine” performance.
Anecdotal evidence further suggests that the pressure to be fair to em-
ployees can trigger strategic gaming by supervisors (Schleicher, Bull, and
Green [2009]). Supervisors may, for example, strategically swap the high-
est rating to another individual in each evaluation round to ensure that
everyone benefits at some point. The lowest rating may likewise alternate
between people when differentiation becomes difficult. These arguments
also suggest that the performance of interest might be weighted less under
forced ratings than under free ratings.
Given the competing arguments on whether the link between perfor-
mance and ratings will be improved or distorted under forced ratings, we
formulate a nondirectional hypothesis.
H4: The relation between the actual performance and the ratings is dif-
ferent under forced ratings compared to free ratings.
3. Method
For our main laboratory experiment, we recruited 108 volunteers from
a participant pool at Maastricht University. The experiment received ap-
proval from the ethics committee (i.e., internal review board). Using the
z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher [2007]), we randomly assigned
participants to groups of four persons. Within each group, one participant
was randomly selected to be the supervisor labeled as player B. The other
three players, labeled as Players A1, A2, and A3, played the role of employ-
ees, who performed their task individually. Participants stayed in these roles
and groups throughout the experiment. On average, participants were
20.6 years old, and 58% were female. The experiment took about 70 min-
utes. During the experiment, participants could earn experimental points
(ECU), which translated to euros once the experiment ended. To keep the
expected payoff constant across treatments, we set the conversion rate for
each treatment such that the compensation ranged from €5 to €25, with an
average payout of €15.6 (Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson [2008]).
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3.1 tasks
3.1.1. Employees. Over the course of five rounds, employees developed
creative solutions to societal problems. In each round, we presented em-
ployees with a different problem and gave them up to three minutes to
develop and describe a creative solution. Participants also had the option
to finish early and earn a time bonus (e.g., Tafkov [2013]).3 In the instruc-
tions, we specified that, to be creative, a solution should be new, innovative,
and useful for solving the problem (Amabile [1996]). Examples of the prob-
lem statement are “How to ensure that office workers do more sports” or
“How to help smokers quit smoking.” Participants could describe as many
ideas as they wanted during the three-minute work period. To log and save
a solution in the computer program, they needed to press the enter but-
ton. Once the three-minute period finished, each participant selected one
idea (from the ideas he or she logged during that round) to submit to the
supervisor for evaluation.
3.1.2. Supervisors. The supervisors’ task was to evaluate the performance
of each employee on a scale ranging from 1 to 3, where 1 = good per-
former, 2 = average performer, and 3 = bad performer. These ratings de-
termined the employees’ compensation. To evaluate the ideas, supervisors
received the ideas that the three employees submitted for the respective
problem after each round. Supervisors could compare the relative creativ-
ity of each idea and assign the ratings for each employee on the same page.
Together with the original ideas, these ratings were then shown to all three
employees, meaning that employees could learn how they performed rela-
tive to their peers and which ideas supervisors assessed as more creative in
that round.
We selected the task to develop creative solutions to societal problems
for several reasons. First, it is an open-ended task without a clear solution,
where supervisors need to subjectively assess the performance. Second, em-
ployees can use different strategies and focus on different aspects of their
ideas, such as the creativity of the idea itself or how it is presented (lan-
guage) to supervisors. This allows us to disentangle different aspects that su-
pervisors incorporate in their ratings. Third, we can state various problem
statements without changing the underlying task characteristics. Finally, the
task does not require specific experience or knowledge.
3.2 compensation
The employees’ compensation depends on the performance ratings they
receive from their supervisors and a time bonus they could earn. The su-
pervisors’ ratings translated into ECU for employees in the following way:
1. Good performer → Employee receives: +300 ECU
3 The time used to develop the solution and, in particular, whether the employee finished
a task before the three minutes was over was never shown to anyone besides the employee.
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2. Average performer → Employee receives: +100 ECU
3. Bad performer → Employee receives: –100 ECU
In addition to these points, employees receive 0.5 ECU time bonus for
every second they save from the three-minute work period. This means em-
ployees face a cost of effort. Working harder increases their chances of re-
ceiving the best rating from the supervisor, but it comes at a cost. To deter-
mine the total earnings for an employee, we summed up all the points that
he or she earned over all five rounds. More ECU leads to higher payoffs.4
The supervisors’ compensation depends on the creativity of their em-
ployees’ ideas. This gives supervisors an incentive to rate their employees
in such a way as to encourage creativity. Specifically, once the experiment
was finished, we showed all the solutions from employees to an indepen-
dent assessment committee, which assessed the creativity of each solution
on a scale from 0 (not very creative) to 100 (very creative). This creativity
score directly translates into ECU for supervisors. For every supervisor, we
then summed up all the points that the ideas from his or her employees
received.
3.3 manipulation
In a 1 × 2 between participants design, we manipulate the performance
evaluation scheme supervisors need to use when evaluating their employ-
ees (Forced vs. Free rating). Half of the supervisors have to use a forced
rating scheme, which required them to use the entire rating scale. Thus,
they must assign each employee a rating of 1 (good performer), 2 (aver-
age performer), or 3 (bad performer), without assigning the same rating
to another employee. The other half of the supervisors could use the entire
range of the scale, but they were not required to do so. They could assign
every employee a different rating, but they could also assign the same rating
to multiple employees. Given that the roles and groups remained constant
throughout the experiment, the supervisor’s manipulation also determined
the manipulation for the employees, who either worked under a forced or
free rating system.
3.4 outcome measures
3.4.1. Effort. To determine the effort, we measure the time used by em-
ployees for developing and describing creative ideas in each round (Time-
Spent) (Bonner et al. [2000]). Remember, participants could stop each
round earlier and receive a time bonus for unused time. If they did so,
they made less effort to look for solutions that might be better than those
they have already conceived.
4 We decided to have a negative number of –100 ECU as the payoff for the lowest rank, be-
cause this simulates the fact that forced ratings often come at a cost for the lowest performing
employee in a company (e.g., in the extreme case, termination). Remember, however, we set
the exchange rate in such a way that the individual with the lowest amount of cumulated ECU
still received a payment of €5. Therefore, negative payouts were not possible.
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3.4.2. Stress. Employees had to indicate their agreement with the state-
ment “I felt stressed when developing the creative solutions” on a scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) after every round. This
serves as the main variable of stress throughout our analysis (Stress). As a
second measure, we examine participants’ cortisol level, which is a widely
used stress indicator in psychology research (e.g., Dickerson and Kemeny
[2004] for a meta-study). When individuals experience stress, the human
body releases cortisol into the bloodstream. It typically takes between 15
and 25 minutes after a stress intervention for the cortisol to appear in saliva
(Dickerson and Kemeny [2004]). Therefore, at three points in time, par-
ticipants are asked to chew on a swab for 60 seconds to provide samples of
their saliva. The first measurement point is before participants start with the
main part of the experiment (about 15 minutes after they entered the labo-
ratory), which establishes the individual’s base level (Cortisol1). The second
and third measurements are taken after they finished the main part (with
10 minutes between these two measurements). The average of the second
and third measurements therefore picks up the stress caused by the dif-
ferent evaluation schemes in our experiment (CortEnd). A higher cortisol
level indicates greater stress. The Dresden Lab Service analyzed all saliva
samples. Although cortisol gives a measure of stress that is not influenced
by perceptions and social desirability, a consistent finding is that the sensi-
tivity of the cortisol measurement via saliva sampling is weaker for females
than for males (Dickerson and Kemeny [2004], Reschke-Hernández et al.
[2017]). The cortisol response can be influenced by the intake of other
hormones (e.g., oral contraceptives) and the menstrual cycles of females.
Therefore, we focus on the male population of our sample for our analysis
of biomarkers (Kudielka, Hellhammer, and Wüst [2009]).
3.4.3. Creativity. To determine the actual creativity of employees’ ideas,
which we also use for the supervisor’s compensation, we invited an indepen-
dent assessment committee. Eight different students from the same univer-
sity completed a 90-minute rating session in the laboratory to assess all the
submitted ideas on a scale from 0 (not very creative) to 100 (very creative;
e.g., Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson [2008], Brüggen, Feichter, and
Williamson [2018]). Participants received €20 for their participation. We
presented the problem statement on top of the screen and the solutions
they had to assess below. Similar to the main experiment, we instructed
these participants that, to be creative, a solution needed to be new, innova-
tive, and useful for solving the problem. Once they evaluated all the solu-
tions to one problem statement, they could take a short break and move
on to the next page with the next statement. We presented the problem
statements in the same order as presented to the employees during the ex-
periment. Moreover, to calibrate the evaluations, we presented the first 30
solutions to each problem in the same order to all eight participants. To
keep the amount of ideas manageable, we split the rest of the ideas in such
a way that each participant had to assess only half of the remaining ideas.
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The Cronbach’s alpha for the first 30 solutions to each problem is 0.71,
and, for all the other ideas, it is 0.66; both are at acceptable levels (Mur-
phy and Davidshofer [1988]). The creativity score for each idea is equal to
the average of the panel’s evaluation score (Creativity). The mean creativity
score assigned by the independent assessment committee was 52.89 (SD =
13.38), ranging from 0.125 to 91 points.5
3.4.4. Ratings. The variable of interest for the supervisor perspective is
the rating they assign to their employees. For ease of interpretation, we
reverse code the ratings such that a zero is the lowest rating that supervi-
sors assign, a one is a medium rating, and a two represents the best rating
(RatingRev). Thus, a higher number means a better rating.
3.5 procedure
The experiment consisted of three parts. Before participants started, one
of the authors explained the procedure for the cortisol measurement. Af-
ter participants gave their consent, they moved to the cubicles. During part
I, participants responded to demographic questions and personality scales
and a 10-item perceived stress scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, and Mermel-
stein [1983], Cohen and Williamson [1988]), which served as a baseline
level of perceived stress. In addition, all participants had a fixed three-
minute trial round to get familiar with the creative task without any com-
pensation or evaluation. The first saliva sampling then occurred. Next, par-
ticipants received the paper-based instructions for part II, the main part
of the experiment. Before participants learned their role as supervisor or
employee, they answered some questions to demonstrate understanding of
the instructions (including the manipulation check). Once they answered
all questions correctly, they could proceed with the five rounds of the exper-
iment. Each round consisted of a three-minute work period for employees
followed by supervisors rating the employees, employees learning about
their ratings, and employees and supervisors having to answer questions
regarding stress levels and perceived fairness. After the last round, the sec-
ond cortisol measurement happened. For the third cortisol measurement,
participants had to wait for another 10 minutes. During this time, partici-
pants completed part III, the postexperimental questionnaire. Finally, par-
ticipants collected their earnings in the week after the experiment.
4. Results
4.1 employee perspective
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the employee’s effort (Time-
Spent), their Stress, and the Creativity of their ideas. Given our experimental
5 In the same week as we ran our main experiment, we ran two additional control treatments
described in detail in footnote 17. The independent assessment committee assessed the ideas
of all these treatments together (randomly ordered). The above statistics refer to all ideas
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T A B L E 1
Descriptive Statistics for Employees
Period
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Free rating TimeSpent 125.2 121.8 127.3 123.2 131.9 125.9
(44.8) (44) (44) (45.4) (42) (43.8)
Stress 3.6 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.5
(1.7) (1.9) (1.8) (1.6) (1.9) (1.8)
Creativity 39.7 49 46.9 48.1 49.3 46.6
(24.9) (24.6) (24.7) (21.6) (22.1) (23.7)
N 42 42 42 42 42 210
Forced rating TimeSpent 125.5 137.9 129.2 135.4 132.6 132.1
(40.9) (35.1) (38.8) (28.3) (35.1) (35.8)
Stress 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.7 4.0
(1.9) (1.6) (1.8) (2.0) (2.0) (1.8)
Creativity 42.8 45 47.9 48.3 49.9 46.8
(22.7) (26.6) (21.6) (21.4) (21.6) (22.8)
N 39 39 39 39 39 195
This table shows the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) by treatment (forced vs. free
rating) of the main dependent variables for the employees’ perspective per period. TimeSpent = time in
seconds that employees spend on the task to create solutions to societal problems (0–180 seconds). Stress =
response to the question “I felt stressed when developing the creative solutions” on a scale from 1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Creativity = score that the independent assessment committee assigned to an
idea on a scale from 0 (not very creative) to 100 (very creative). N = number of participants.
setup, we collect multiple observations per individual, and participants
work in groups that are stable over time.6 Similar to Berger, Harbring, and
Sliwka [2013], we account for this dependency by running random-effect
regressions with clustered standard errors at the group level and control for
period dummies, unless otherwise stated (Feldman [1988], Angrist and Pis-
chke [2009], Athey and Imbens [2017], Wooldridge [2016]). The random
effects account for individual heterogeneity, whereas clustering on group
level captures potential differences in group dynamics. The period dum-
mies account for common trends across periods.7
assessed by the committee. When participants did not submit any idea, we imputed a creativity
score of 0.
6 In our analyses further reported, we treat the data from round 1 as trial and only include
the data from rounds two through five for which participants received rating feedback. In
round 1, participants might still need to adjust to the experimental setup (i.e., the rating
scheme) and try different strategies unrelated to our variables of interest. Our main results
are the same if we include round 1 in our analysis.
7 Our data structure warrants a random-effect estimation with clustered standard errors at
a group level. We have 27 group clusters, which should be reasonable, as research suggests
between 20 and 50 clusters (Cameron and Miller 2015) for reliable estimates. In untabulated
results, we use random-effect regressions and cluster the standard errors on the individual,
instead of the group level. While this method captures idiosyncratic individual effects, it does
not account for the different group dynamics. The main results comport with those reported
in the paper (all p’s < 0.10).
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T A B L E 2
Employees’ Perspective
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Creativity TimeSpent Stress CortEnd Creativity
Forced 1.293 4.796 0.942*** 0.593*







PSS 0.035 −4.296 0.764*** 0.652
(1.12) (3.19) (0.13) (1.15)
Cortisol1 0.321***
(0.11)
Constant 57.697*** 0.000 0.382 1.182** 32.683***
(5.29) (0.00) (0.54) (0.44) (8.69)
Observations 283 324 324 35 283
Participants 81 81 81 35 81
R2 0.021 0.021 0.163 0.319 0.092
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes
This table shows the random-effect regressions for the main variable of interest from the employees’
perspective. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at a group level. Models 1/2/3/5 include the
observations from employees in periods 2–5. Model 4 includes only male employees. For model 5, we sub-
tracted the minimum values of TimeSpent and Stress from these variables, for ease of interpretation. Forced
= an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if they worked under the forced rating scheme (free
rating scheme). TimeSpent = time in seconds that employees spend on the task to create solutions to societal
problems (0–180 seconds). Stress = the value of the response to the question “I felt stressed when develop-
ing the creative solutions.” PSS = responses to 10-item perceived stress scale from Cohen, Kamarck, and
Mermelstein [1983] and Cohen and Williamson [1988]. Creativity = score that the independent assessment
committee assigned to an idea on a scale from 0 (not very creative) to 100 (very creative). Cortisol1 = cortisol
level of participants before they start the main part of the experiment. CortEnd = the mean cortisol level of
participants from the second and third cortisol measurement.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 indicate significance levels (two-tailed).
We start our analysis with examining how forced ratings, compared to
free ratings, affect the employee performance in our experimental task.
We run our regression with the Creativity of the employees’ ideas as the de-
pendent variable and Forced as independent variable. As employees in the
forced ratings scored significantly lower on Cohen’s PSS before they started
the experiment, we also control for their response on this scale.8 The results
in column 1 of table 2 show that there is no significant difference in the
creativity between forced and free ratings (p = 0.59). Thus, in contrast to
prior studies documenting a positive performance effect of forced ratings
in tasks where supervisors have access to an objective measure (e.g., Berger,
Harbring, and Sliwka [2013]), we do not find performance enhancing ef-
fects in our setting. In the next step, we examine our theoretical model,
8 Testing for random assignment shows no significant differences between treatments with
respect to gender, age, year of study, and risk-taking for supervisors and employees (all p’s >
0.10).
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which may explain why forced ratings do not enhance the performance in
settings requiring a more subjective assessment.
4.1.1. Test of H1: Effect of Forced Ratings on Employee Effort. We predict that
forced ratings have a different influence on the employees’ effort, com-
pared to free ratings. TimeSpent serves as the dependent variable in our
regression and the treatment Forced as the main independent variable. We
also control for PSS. Contrary to H1, the results in column 2 show that ef-
fort between the Forced and free rating systems does not significantly differ
(coeff. 4.796, p = 0.56). Thus, although studies have shown positive effects
of forced ratings on employee effort in settings with objective performance
measures, we do not find such a positive effect in our setting.9
4.1.2. Test of H2: Effect of Forced Ratings on Employee Stress. H2 predicts that
forced ratings lead to higher stress among employees, compared to free
ratings. We use the perceived stress as the dependent variable (Stress) and
Forced as the main independent variable and control for PSS. The results in
column 3 of table 2 show that PSS is significantly related to the Stress that
participants experience during the experiment (coeff. 0.764, p < 0.01).
More importantly, participants in the forced rating system report higher
stress compared to participants in the free rating system (coeff. 0.942, p <
0.01), even when we control for the initial differences in the PSS in our
regression.10 This provides support for H2.
We also examine the neurological stress reaction using the cortisol level
of the male participants. As we only have one observation per person, we
run an OLS regression with the cortisol level at the end of the experiment
(CortEnd) as the dependent variable, the Forced rating as the main indepen-
dent variable, and Cortisol1 as a control variable to capture the baseline of
9 Analytical studies argue that positive effort effects of forced ratings are stronger when
the ability differences within groups are relatively low (e.g., Lazear and Rosen [1981], Hvide
[2002]). Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka [2013] formed groups with homogeneous abilities.
Based on employees’ response to the postexperimental questionnaire item: “In general, I feel
that I am good in generating novel ideas” (scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly
agree), we median split our sample in groups that show a high (heterogeneous) and low
(homogeneous) within-group difference and run separate analyses. Untabulated results show
that neither in heterogeneous (coeff. –8.875, p = 0.13) nor in homogeneous groups (coeff.
15.789, p = 0.18) are there significant differences between forced and free ratings. That said,
in line with the argument that employees in heterogeneous groups might get complacent in
the forced ratings over time as they figure out that they will win/have no chance to win the
tournament, we do find a negative interaction effect of Forced_×_Period on effort in the het-
erogeneous groups (coeff. –10.617, p < 0.01), but not in the homogeneous groups (coeff.
2.188, p = 0.54). Thus, while we overall do not find support for H1, our analysis shows that
forced rating systems work better in homogeneous, compared to heterogeneous groups, by
sustaining the employees’ effort.
10 In an untabulated analysis, we run the same regression but also control for the TimeSpent.
Even though there is a significant relation between the TimeSpent and the Stress (coeff. 0.004,
p = 0.06), Forced still has a highly significant effect on Stress (coeff. 0.922, p < 0.01), consistent
with H2.
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each participant.11 In line with the results on the perceived stress measure,
the results in column 4 show that participants in the forced rating system
had a significantly higher cortisol level than participants in the free rating
system at the end of the experiment (coeff. 0.593, p = 0.09). This provides
further evidence that forced rating systems cause greater stress.
4.1.3. Test of H3: Effect of Stress on Relations Between Effort and Creativity. Fi-
nally, we predict that high levels of stress mute the positive relation between
effort and creativity. We run our regression with the Creativity as the de-
pendent variable. The perceived stress measure (Stress), the effort measure
(TimeSpent), and the interaction of stress and effort (Stress_×_TimeSpent)
are the independent variables. For ease of interpretation, we subtract the
minimum values of Stress and TimeSpent from their values. We also in-
clude the PSS as control variable. Column 5 shows that TimeSpent leads to
higher Creativity (coeff. 0.162, p < 0.01), indicating that creativity increases
with effort in our setting. Importantly, however, the negative interaction of
TimeSpent_×_Stress (coeff. –0.024, p = 0.06) shows that the effort–creativity
relation is much weaker when participants report higher levels of stress,
which is in line with the choking under pressure argument put forward in
H3.12 To gain further insights into this relation, we examine the simple ef-
fect of TimeSpent at various levels of the stress (minimum, 25th/50th/75th
percentile, and maximum). The untabulated results show a significantly
positive relation of effort and creativity up to the 50th percentile of stress,
but no significant effect at the 75th percentile or maximum anymore. This
provides further evidence that effort does not bring additional creative per-
formance when employees are highly stressed.13
11 For the subsample of male participants, the mean CortEnd is 3.07 nmol/L (SD = 1.22)
in the forced ratings treatment and 2.23 nmol/L (SD = 0.66) in the free ratings treatment.
The correlation between the perceived stress measure and the cortisol level for this group is
0.161 (p = 0.05). As the Cortisol1 already accounts for baseline differences in the stress among
individuals, we do not include the PSS in this analysis.
12 Because of a user error while submitting the ideas, we had to exclude 41 of our 324 obser-
vations in this analysis. In some instances, employees described their ideas but did not press
the enter button, which meant that their idea was not stored on the computer. We identify
these observations by examining when employees worked for more than 50 seconds on the
task but did not submit any idea. There is no significant difference of this user error between
the free and forced rating employees, and only four employees did not submit any idea more
than two times (two in the forced rating treatment and two in the free rating treatment).
However, when we include these 41 observations and use a dummy to control for these obser-
vations, the results are consistent with stress mitigating the positive effort–creativity relation
(TimeSpent_×_Stress –0.022, p = 0.036).
13 As we measure both the TimeSpent and Creativity for our analysis of H3, there might be con-
cerns that we do not document a causal relation but creative individuals simply prefer working
longer on the task. While our random-effects model already controls for unobserved hetero-
geneity in individuals, we can specifically control for individual’s creative ability as measured
by the PEQ item discussed in footnote 9. Including this variable to our main regression shows
that the results remain unchanged. We still find a negative interaction of TimeSpent_×_Stress
(coeff. –0.024, p = 0.06).
20 e. cardinaels and c. feichter
In sum, our theoretical model can thus explain why we do not find over-
all performance effects of forced ratings in our task setting that requires
a subjective evaluation. Specifically, we do not find any difference in the
effort between forced and free ratings (H1), but we do show that forced
ratings lead to higher experienced stress in our setting (H2). High levels of
stress in turn mitigate the positive effort–performance relation in our cre-
ative task, consistent with the choking under pressure argument (H3). In
section 5, we report the results of an additional experiment as corroborat-
ing evidence for the different effect that forced ratings in a subjective task
setting have on employees, compared with a setting in which an objective
measure is available.
4.2 supervisor perspective
One reason for firms to install forced rating systems is to counteract le-
niency and compression in the performance ratings. To test whether ratings
in a free rating system are more lenient compared to forced ratings, we use
the supervisors’ ratings as the dependent variable (RatingRev) and the Cre-
ativity of the employees’ idea and the Forced treatment as the independent
variables. Similar to the employee perspective, we run random-effect re-
gressions with clustered standard errors and control for period dummies in
all supervisor regressions, unless otherwise stated. We also include a con-
trol variable for NoIdeaSubmitted, as supervisors had to assign ratings to all
three employees, even if they did not submit any idea (but in almost all
cases automatically assigned the lowest rating).14 Results in column 1 of ta-
ble 3 show that, after we control for the actual Creativity score of the ideas,
supervisors assign lower ratings in a forced rating system (coeff. –0.254,
p < 0.01). Hence, a forced system indeed reduces leniency and compres-
sion in the performance evaluation.15 The Creativity of ideas themselves has
a positive effect on the ratings (coeff. 0.008, p = 0.02).
4.2.1. Test of H4: Influence of Creativity on the Ratings. We predict a differ-
ence in the relation between actual performance and the ratings supervi-
sors assign between forced and free rating systems. The analysis in column
2 of table 3 shows that creativity indeed has a positive relation with the rat-
ings (coeff. 0.011, p < 0.01). However, the significant negative interaction
of Forced_×_Creativity (coeff. –0.007, p < 0.01) shows that supervisors weigh
creativity less when determining their ratings in the forced than in the free
14 We also run the supervisor analyses without this control variable but rather treat them
as regular observations. All inferences remain similar. The only p-value that would exceed the
threshold of 0.10 is the interaction of Forced_×_FleschKincaid of column 2 of Table 4, where
the two-tailed p-value would rise from 0.06 to 0.12.
15 In an untabulated analysis, we test whether forced ratings decrease compression in the
ratings. For each group, we calculate the standard deviation of the ratings per period (SDRat-
ings). Running a regression with the SDRatings as the dependent variable and Forced and the
period dummies as independent variables shows that Forced significantly increases the variation
in the ratings (coeff. 0.262, p < 0.01).
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T A B L E 3
The Effect of Creativity on the Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Overall Forced Free
Dependent Variable RatingRev RatingRev RatingRev RatingRev
Creativity 0.008** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.008*









NoIdeaReceived −0.825*** −0.842*** −0.692** −0.893***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.28) (0.21)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.520* 1.084***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.23)
Observations 324 324 156 168
Participants 81 81 39 42
R2 0.345 0.354 0.220 0.460
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows the random-effect regressions for the relation between the creativity scores of the ideas
and the ratings that employees received. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at a group level.
Models 1–4 include periods 2–5. Models 1 and 2 include observations from forced and free rating scheme.
Model 3 (4) includes only observations from the forced rating (free rating) scheme. RatingRev = reverse
coded ratings; 0 is lowest rating and 2 is highest rating. Creativity = score that the independent assessment
committee assigned to an idea on a scale from 0 (not very creative) to 100 (very creative). Forced = an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if they worked under the forced rating scheme (free rating
scheme). Period = a continuous variable ranging from 2 to 5. NoIdeaReceived = an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 when the employee did not submit any idea.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 indicate significance levels (two-tailed).
rating system. This supports H4. Although forced ratings are supposed to
enhance the link between actual creativity and the ratings, this result sug-
gests that the impact of the creativity on the final ratings is lower under
forced ratings.
A concern could be that this negative interaction is driven by supervisors
who need to differentiate their ratings in the forced systems, even though
the creativity of the ideas they need to evaluate is relatively close to each
other. Therefore, in each period, we median split our sample based on the
standard deviation of the creativity of ideas within a group, and we run the
analysis separately for situations in which the creativity of the ideas is close
to each other or far apart. Untabulated results show that the interaction of
Forced_×_Creativity is not significantly different from zero (p > 0.29) when
the creativity of the ideas is close, but it is significantly negative if the cre-
ativity of the ideas is further apart (coeff. –0.007, p < 0.01). This suggests
that supervisors using the forced ratings fail to adequately rate their em-
ployees, particularly in situations in which it would be fairly easy to assign
the ratings based on the actual creativity. Moreover, columns 3 and 4 show
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that the impact of creativity on the ratings in the forced ratings decreases
over time (coeff. –0.003, p = 0.09), whereas no such negative time trend
occurs in the free rating system (p = 0.50). If a mechanical relationship was
driving our results, then the negative effect would be stable across periods.
This again suggests that supervisors fail to incorporate creativity adequately
under forced ratings.16
Collectively, these findings support H4; the link between actual perfor-
mance and the ratings differs with forced ratings. Instead of improving this
relation, forced ratings distort it compared to free ratings.17 We next exam-
ine two potential reasons for this distortion. First, supervisors may consider
other information that is easier to justify but less relevant to performance;
second, they strategically game the system by swapping the ratings over time.
4.2.1.1 Influence of Eloquent Language in the Description of Ideas on Ratings.
One way in which supervisors may resolve their discomfort when using
forced ratings is by focusing on aspects of the performance that are eas-
ier to justify to employees. Studies have shown that complex and eloquent
language in narratives is often used to impress receivers of a message and
obfuscate the content (Merkl-Davies and Brennan [2007], Brennan et al.
[2009], Li [2008], Rennekamp [2012], Holoien and Fiske [2013]). Thus,
instead of evaluating employees based on the creativity of their ideas, su-
pervisors in the forced ratings might focus more heavily on the language
used in these descriptions.
For each idea, we calculate two widely used readability indices. First, we
calculate the average word length (the characters per solution divided by
the words per solution), where longer words are often perceived to reflect
16 In an alternative specification, we create an ordinal ranking ranging from 1 to 3 based
on the creativity score that the ideas within each group and period received from the inde-
pendent rater panel (CreativityOrdinal). We find similar evidence as reported above. If ideas
are close together, the interaction of Forced_×_CreativityOrdinal is not significant (p > 0.41). In
contrast, when the creativity of the ideas is further apart and thus when it would be easier to
differentiate, we again find a negative interaction of Forced_×_CreativityOrdinal (coeff. –0.199,
p = 0.09), confirming that this connection is again weaker under forced ratings than under
free ratings.
17 To examine whether results would change if participants did not stay in the same group
throughout the experiment, we run two additional control treatments with forced and free
ratings using 104 different volunteers from the same university. People stay in their roles as
employee and supervisor, but they are randomly rematched to new groups after each round.
This prevents learning about ability differences or the rating behavior of their supervisors.
We rerun our main regressions (with random effects and period dummies, but without group
clustering given the rematching) and add an indicator for Rematching and an interaction of
Forced_×_Rematching. Untabulated results show that our main regressions used for testing the
hypotheses do not change with adding these two control treatments. Moreover, in none of
the regressions the interaction between Forced_×_Rematching is significant (all p’s> 0.14), and
the Rematching variable is only significant in the effort regression (coeff. 13.883, p = 0.05)
suggesting that the rematching groups spend more time on the task (but still no difference
between forced and free ratings). Thus, our conclusions are not influenced by whether groups
are stable over time or rematched.
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T A B L E 4
The Influence of Eloquent Language on the Ratings
(1) (2)






















Period dummies Yes Yes
This table shows the random-effect regressions for the relation between the creativity scores and the
use of eloquent language in the descriptions of the creative solutions and the ratings that employees re-
ceive. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on a group level. Period dummies are included. One
observation did not include any text → no readability index. Creativity = score that the independent as-
sessment committee assigned to an idea on a scale from 0 (not very creative) to 100 (very creative). Forced
= an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if they worked under the forced rating scheme (free
rating scheme). WordLength = the average word length per idea. FleschKincaid = the readability of an idea
considering the sentence and word length. NoIdeaReceived = an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
when the employee did not submit any idea.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 indicate significance levels (two-tailed).
more complex concepts (Lewis and Frank [2016]). Second, we calculate
the Flesch–Kincaid grade level index, which gives the U.S. school grade
level that is required to understand a text (Kincaid et al. [1975], Benoit,
Munger, and Spirling [2019]).18 For both measures, higher values indicate
more eloquent and complex language.
The results in table 4 provide evidence consistent with our reasoning.
Creativity has a positive relation with the ratings but this effect is weaker
under forced ratings (Forced_×_Creativity coeff. –0.007, p < 0.01 and coeff.
–0.005, p = 0.04). At the same time, the positive and significant interactions
of Forced_×_WordLength (coeff. 0.241, p = 0.10) and Forced_×_FleschKincaid
(coeff. 0.033, p = 0.06) show that more eloquent language positively
18 The formula to calculate this index is as follows: [0.35 × (total words/total sentences) +
11.8 × (total syllables/total words) − 15.59]. We used the R package textstat_readability.R to
calculate it.
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influences the ratings under a forced rating system. Thus, supervisors re-
duce the weight on the creativity of ideas in favor of other potentially less
important dimensions under forced ratings. In fact, an insignificant corre-
lation between Creativity and the WordLength (r = 0.036, p = 0.48) and a
negative correlation between Creativity and FleschKincaid (r = –0.177, p <
0.01) show that the eloquent language does not increase the actual creativ-
ity of the ideas.19
4.2.1.2 Strategic Gaming by Supervisors. Strategic gaming might be a sec-
ond explanation for why supervisors in the forced rating system consider
the creativity of the ideas less in their ratings, compared to those in the free
rating system. To identify this behavior, we count the total number of times
a supervisor changes the rating within each group from one period to the
other (SwitchGroup). The results in column 1 of table 5 show that supervi-
sors change their ratings more frequently in the forced, compared with the
free rating treatment (coeff. 1.324, p = 0.04). Interestingly, the results in
column 2 suggest that this cannot be explained by justified switches from
the supervisor. In fact, the negative interaction of Forced_×_SwitchJustGroup
suggests switches in the group-ratings that would be justified determine the
actual switches less in forced, compared with the free ratings (coeff. –0.819,
p = 0.02).20
We also examine how the rating in the last period (RatingRevLag) influ-
ences the rating in the next period (RatingRev), controlling for the actual
Creativity. Consistent with the notion of strategic gaming, the results in col-
umn 3 show that, while last period’s rating has no effect on this period’s
rating in the free rating treatment (p = 0.15), there is a significant neg-
ative interaction of Forced_×_RatingRevLag (coeff. –0.173, p = 0.08). Simi-
larly, column 4 shows that, when an employee received the highest rating in
the previous period (WinnerLag), the likelihood of being the winner in the
new period is also significantly lower in the forced rating treatment (coeff.
of Forced_×_WinnerLag = –0.178, p = 0.09). These findings render further
support to the claim that supervisors engage in strategic gaming.
19 To gain confidence that supervisors under a forced rating system focus more on objective
measures, we ran an MTurk-experiment. Forty supervisors using either forced or free ratings
(between participants) had to evaluate 12 employees (matched in groups of three), who per-
formed the Torrance Alternative use task for 2.5 minutes (e.g., develop as many creative ideas
for alternative uses of a wine bottle). In this task, supervisors can focus on the quantity of ideas
(objective measure) or their creativity. Results confirm that supervisors using forced ratings
put a stronger weight on the quantity than under free ratings (coeff. of Quantity_×_Forced
0.031, p < 0.01). In contrast, we find no difference with respect to the creativity dimension or
the compensation scenario they worked under (variable of fixed compensation).
20 Responses to postexperimental questionnaire items show that supervisors who swapped
the ratings more frequently in the forced ratings (compared to free ratings) feel that their em-
ployees consider their rating behavior as fairer (coeff. 0.563, p = 0.09) and are aware that their
ratings do not fully reflect the creativity of the ideas (coeff. –0.468, p = 0.11). This suggests
that supervisors strategically switch the ratings.
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T A B L E 5
Supervisors’ Strategic Gaming Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable SwitchGroup SwitchGroup RatingRev Winner
Forced 1.324** 8.147*** −0.067 −0.063

















Constant 7.214*** 5.250*** 0.960*** 0.247**
(0.43) (1.60) (0.20) (0.12)
Observations 27 27 324 324
Participants 27 27 81 81
R2 0.153 0.330 0.352 0.148
Period dummies No No Yes Yes
This table shows the regressions for the supervisors’ strategic switching behavior in the ratings of their
employees. Standard errors are in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are OLS regressions. Models 3 and 4 are
random-effects models with clustered standard errors on a group level. SwitchGroup = total number of times
the supervisor changes the rating within each group from one period to the other period. RatingRev(Lag)
= reverse coded ratings; 0 is lowest rating and 2 is highest rating in this period (in the previous period).
Winner(Lag) = indicator variable that takes the value of 1 in case the employee receives the highest rating
(received the highest rating in the previous round). SwitchJustGroup = total number of times the relative
creativity of employees changes from one period to the other period. Creativity = score that the independent
assessment committee assigned to an idea on a scale from 0 (not very creative) to 100 (very creative).
∗∗∗p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 indicate significance levels (two-tailed).
5. Additional Experiment
A major finding of our main experiment is that forced ratings affect em-
ployees differently in our setting, which requires subjective evaluation com-
pared with studies using tasks that can be objectively evaluated (e.g., Berger,
Harbring, and Sliwka [2013]). To gain further confidence that forced rat-
ings work differently in these types of settings and gain additional insights
into the underlying process, we conduct an online experiment with Pro-
lific participants.21 In a 2 × 2 between-participants design, we manipulate
21 Prolific allows the application of pre-screening criteria. We used an approval rate of 95%.
Participants needed to be native English speakers, have no literacy problems, and be a mini-
mum of 18 years old. In total, we received 161 responses of which we use 159 in the analyses.
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the task environment (objective vs. subjective task) and the rating system
(forced vs. free). In the objective task setting, employee participants have
three minutes to solve slider bars (in which the number of correctly solved
bars is the objective performance indicator), while in the subjective task,
employees can use the three minutes to develop a creative idea for a so-
cietal problem (i.e., “How to ensure office workers do more sports”). Em-
ployees are again matched with two other employees and are made aware
that one supervisor (another Prolific participant) will evaluate them later
on a scale ranging from 1 to 3, either under a forced or a free rating system,
similar to that used in the main experiment. In addition to a starting fee of
2 British pounds (GBP), the lowest rating carried no bonus for employees,
the middle rating 5 GBP and the highest rating 10 GBP. To keep the exper-
iment as simple as possible, we run it only for one round, and employees
receive information about their rating and their bonus at the moment of
their payout (i.e., after the experiment was finished).
If we already find different effects of forced ratings on employee reac-
tions in this simple setup, we can offer more evidence for our reasoning
that stress with regard to the evaluation and the consequences on perfor-
mance differ, depending on the setting. According to our theory, we first ex-
pect that forced ratings relative to free ratings cause more uncertainty and
worries about the evaluation in the subjective setting. This in turn affects
the perceived stress with respect to the evaluation. Finally, we expect that
this stress hinders creativity by mitigating the positive effort–performance
relation, but we do not expect such a mitigating effect in the objective task
setting.
Before going to the analyses on stress measurement, table 6 shows the
effect of forced ratings on the performance on both tasks. For the slider
task, we measure the number of sliders solved correctly. For assessing the
creativity of the ideas, we again recruited an independent assessment com-
mittee of eight different Prolific workers, who received 6 GBP.22 We rank
the employees’ performance on the respective task, to better compare per-
formance across tasks.23 The results in column 1 show that forced ratings
The two participants we removed failed two of three attention check questions. Participants
were on average 31.8 years old and had 12.5 years of work experience. To ensure payment,
four supervisors received 5 GBP for evaluating performance of multiple pairs of three em-
ployees. Half of the supervisors used a forced rating system, whereas the other half used a free
rating system.
22 We excluded two of the eight raters from the data analysis. One rater assigned a value of
100 to 76 of 81 ideas; the other one had no significant correlation with 5 of the 6 remaining
raters and decreases the Cronbach’s alpha from 0.736 to 0.619. Our inferences stay the same
if we include them in the analysis.
23 Given the use of an online platform, it is important to control our performance regres-
sions for factors that create variation in online settings. In the slider task, we control for the
use of computer mouse that can vary depending on the type of device participants use (i.e.
touch screen computers versus desktops with a separate computer mouse). Performance on
the slider task is likely to be sensitive to this use. For the creative task, the PEQ item “Internet”
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T A B L E 6
Performance of Experiment 2
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the performance
Rating Scheme
Free Forced Total
Slider Task Number of sliders 59.7 64.5 62.1
PerformanceRank 35.9 43.1 39.5
N 39 39 78
Creative Task Creativity 51.1 49 50
PerformanceRank 42.9 39.2 41
N 39 42 81
Total PerformanceRank 39.4 41.1 40.3
N 78 81 159
Panel B: Regressions for performance
(1) (2)
Slider Task Creative Task Difference
Dependent Variable PerformanceRank PerformanceRank (1) and (2)
Forced 8.301* −3.889 chi-square = 2.89,









Gender Control Yes Yes
Panel A shows the descriptive performance results of Experiment 2. Panel B reports the OLS regressions
for the performance. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model 1 in panel B reports the results of the
slider task. Model 2 in panel B reports the results of the creative task. Difference test of coefficients between
columns 1 and 2 is based on seemingly unrelated regression estimation. PerformanceRank = the ranked
performance on the respective task. The better the performance, the higher the rank. ComputerMouse =
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the participant used a computer mouse, or 0 if not. Internet
= it is the response to the PEQ item: “To what extent did you use the Internet, books, or asked another
individual for help to develop your creative idea?” on the scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent).
Gender Control = dummy variables for female and other.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 indicate significance levels (two-tailed).
induce higher performance in the slider task, which replicates the findings
of Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka [2013]. However, similar to the results of
our main experiment, the same forced rating system does not increase per-
formance in the creative task. The difference of the Forced coefficients in
captures the extent of use of alternative strategies (Internet, books, help of colleague) to come
up with a solution on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent). Even though we have
no reason to expect an effect on performance, as standard creative answers are not available
for the specific societal problem, we still feel it is important to control for this. The use of such
alternative strategies is indeed very low (mean = 1.457). Moreover, our statistical inferences
remain similar when we exclude either of these controls.
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the two regressions is significant (chi-square = 2.89, p = 0.09), supporting
our claim that the system works differently in a subjective setting.
Table 7 provides the results with respect to the stress and the underly-
ing process. Panel A shows how the rating systems affect antecedents of
stress (i.e., stressor) in the different task settings. This stressor measures
the worries and uncertainties individuals have with respect to the evalua-
tion. We measure this variable using three postexperimental questionnaire
items that capture whether people thought a lot about the criteria, their
rating, and their potential for the bonus in the upcoming evaluation while
they performed the task (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76). The analysis in model 1
of panel A show that participants under the forced rating worry less about
their evaluation than under the free rating (coeff. = –0.718, p = 0.02).
However, model 2 of panel A shows that this relationship flips for the cre-
ative task (coeff. = 0.643, p = 0.03), indicating that participants worry more
about their evaluation in the forced rating system compared to the free rat-
ing system. Consistent with our expectation, the difference of the Forced
coefficient across the two regressions is significant (chi-square = 10.23, p <
0.01).24 This confirms that the rating systems affect the stressor differently
in the subjective versus objective task. Individuals worry more about their
evaluation when forced ratings are used in a subjective setting. Importantly,
model 3 of panel A confirms that this stressor is an important antecedent
for the experienced stress level (coeff. 0.563, p < 0.01).25
Finally, in panel B of table 7, we examine how stress affects the perfor-
mance in the different task settings and, in particular, how it affects the
effort–performance relation. To measure the effort, we create a variable
(i.e., engagement) using three postexperimental questionnaire items, ask-
ing participants about their effort, motivation, and engagement in the task
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). Consistent with our findings of the main ex-
periment (H3), model 2 shows that, while effort has a positive effect on
creative performance, the effect is largely mitigated with elevated levels of
stress in the creative task (coeff. –5.609, p < 0.01).26 This interaction is not
24 The lower level of the stressor under forced ratings compared to the free rating in the
objective task setting might seem surprising at first. However, it is consistent with the argument
that forced ratings can protect employees from the supervisor reneging in the performance
evaluation by giving out low ratings to all employees.
25 To capture the sequential process, we leave out our manipulations in this regression.
When we include the variables for our manipulations in the regression with StressEvaluation
as the dependent variable, they are not significant, as the stressor already absorbs most of the
variance of the manipulated factors.
26 The results show an unpredicted positive main effect of stress on creativity (22.048, p <
0.01). We follow up on this observation and calculate the direct effect of stress on creativity at
multiple levels of engagement. The results show that already at the 25th percentile of engage-
ment the effect is not significant anymore and the sign is already negative (–0.386, p = 0.80).
It stays negative and even reaches significance at higher levels of stress (e.g., at the 75th per-
centile of engagement the effect is –5.994, p < 0.01). Untabulated results from experiment
1 show comparable results. This suggests that at minimum effort levels, stress has a positive
effect on creativity, which goes away at moderate and high levels of effort.
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T A B L E 7
Process Model for Experiment 2
Panel A: Influence of treatments on the process variables
(1) (2) (3)
Slider Task Creative Task Difference
Dependent Variable Stressor Stressor StressEvaluation (1) and (2)
ForcedRating −0.718** 0.643** chi-square = 10.23
(0.31) (0.30) p-value < 0.01
Stressor 0.563***
(0.09)
Constant 4.780*** 3.290*** 0.045**
(0.33) (0.30) (0.44)
Observations 78 81 159
R2 0.070 0.101 0.214
Gender Control Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Influence of process variables on the performance
(1) (2)
Slider Task Creative Task Difference





Engagement_×_StressEvaluation −0.793 −5.609*** chi-square = 6.43









Gender Control Yes Yes
This table shows the regressions for the process model for experiment 2. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Model 1 (2) in panel B reports the results of the SliderTask (CreativeTask). Difference test of coeffi-
cients between columns 1 and 2 is based on seemingly unrelated regression estimation. Stressor = average
of the responses to “While performing the task, I thought a lot about the criteria the Evaluator will use for
assigning the ratings,” “While performing the task, I thought a lot about the rating I will receive from the
Evaluator,” “While performing the task, I thought a lot about the potential bonus I can receive,” all on a
scale from 1 to 7. StressEvaluation = response to statement “I feel nervous and ‘stressed’ about the evalua-
tion the Evaluator will conduct” on a scale from 1 to 7. For ease of interpretation, we subtract the minimum
value. Engagement = average of the responses to “I put a lot of effort in the task,” “I felt motivated to conduct
this task,” and “I was very much engaged with this task” on a scale from 1 to 7. For ease of interpretation, we
subtract the minimum value. ComputerMouse = dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the participant
used a computer mouse, or 0 if not. Internet = it is the response to the PEQ item: “To what extent did you
use the Internet, books, or asked another individual for help to develop your creative idea?” on the scale
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent). PerformanceRank = the ranked performance on the respective
task. The better the performance, the higher the rank. Gender Control = dummy variables for female and
other.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 indicate significance levels (two-tailed).
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significant in the objective slider task (p = 0.57), where only effort has a
positive effect on performance (coeff. 5.897, p = 0.09). The difference in
the interaction coefficients across these two regressions is significant (chi-
square = 6.43, p = 0.01). Similar to the main experiment, we examine
the effect of engagement on the creative performance at different levels
of stress. Consistent with the choking under pressure argument (H3), the
untabulated results show that engagement has a significantly positive re-
lation with creativity at the minimum level and 25th percentile of stress,
which gets insignificant at the median level and turns negative at the 75th
and maximum level of stress.27
In sum, this additional experiment shows that forced ratings indeed
increase worries about the evaluation (i.e., stressor), which subsequently
causes higher stress. This stress has different performance effects in a cre-
ative task. Specifically, higher levels of stress reduce the effort–performance
relation only in the creative task but not in the slider task, which can explain
why we do not observe a beneficial effect on performance from forced rat-
ing in the creative task.
6. Conclusion
In two experiments, we examine the effects of forced and free rating sys-
tems on both employee reaction and supervisor rating behavior. In both ex-
periments, we do not find any difference in the creative task performance
between the two rating systems. However, we do find that forced ratings in-
crease employee stress in the creative task setting and that this greater stress
reduces the positive effort–creativity relation. In contrast, for a task where
objective performance measures are available, we find that a forced rating
actually decreases the stress with respect to the evaluation and that a forced
rating can lead to performance enhancing effects—similar to findings of
prior research (Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka [2013]). This suggests that
forced ratings affect employees differently, depending on the task setting.
Furthermore, from the supervisor perspective, we show that, even though
forced ratings are supposed to increase the link between the actual per-
formance and the ratings employees receive, we find that this relation is
actually weaker with forced ratings compared to free ratings. This distor-
tion occurs because supervisors using forced ratings tend to focus on other
aspects than the underlying creativity in their evaluations (e.g., eloquent
language) and strategically game the system by swapping ratings across indi-
viduals and periods. Together these results point to the downsides of forced
27 Moreover, similar as to our main experiment, we control for participants responses to the
PEQ item “In general, I feel that I am good in developing creative ideas” in an untabulated
regression. The results are similar to the analysis without the control variable (interaction
of Engagement_×_Stress coeff. –5.596, p < 0.01). This indicates that perceived creative ability
unlikely drives the effort–creativity relation.
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rating systems in settings where supervisors asses performance more subjec-
tively.
Our findings underline concerns that practitioners often raise with re-
spect to forced ratings. They often argue that such systems are counterpro-
ductive, particularly for talent-intensive companies (Guralnik, Rozmarin,
and So [2004], Gupta [2018]), where forced ratings may hamper the pur-
suit of innovation. Our results suggest that forced ratings may not gener-
ate performance improvements in jobs where performance is difficult to
capture via objective measures (e.g., Campbell [2012]). A caution here is
that we obtain our results in a more short-term oriented creativity setting,
where incentives may not produce powerful effects (similar as what prior
studies have shown). Nevertheless, prior studies using these short-term ori-
ented tasks allude to the choking under pressure argument as explanation
why they might not find effects on creative performance, for which we pro-
vide direct evidence. Forced rating systems (relative to free ratings) can
cause worries about the evaluation, which creates stress (including biologi-
cal stress reactions). The stress undermines the positive effects of effort on
creativity. Also, practitioners warn that forced ratings may create stress. It
is important that firms are aware of these potential costs and side effects
(e.g., higher stress and supervisors not assigning appropriate ratings). In
fact, the greater stress that forced rating systems cause can lead to other
long-term side effects, such as higher turnover rates, health problems, and
lack of motivation.
Our results also provide avenues for future research. For example, fu-
ture research can explore how other evaluation systems cause stress or how
forced ratings work when other subjective dimensions of performance are
evaluated, such as due diligence in an audit world or corporate citizenship
or cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms. Research could also explore
the effects of such systems in attracting and retaining talent. Some of the ad-
verse effects we document may be mitigated when such systems attract more
competitive people. Alternatively, future research can examine the effects
of forced ratings in tasks with a longer time horizon where potential stress
effects can be mitigated by implementing rest-periods (e.g., Kachelmeier,
Wang, and Williamson [2019]). Such research can also examine forced rat-
ings in combination with other control choices (like corporate culture, day
off to spend time on innovation) that may induce forced ratings to motivate
effort while at the same time alleviate stress that may go along with these sys-
tems. Finally, future research can examine the long-term side effects of the
distorted ratings that supervisors give in a forced rating system. Firms may
be worse off if employees learn that they can sidestep being downgraded
by taking less risk or by focusing on less important aspects that matter for
winning the tournament.
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